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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, an African American woman received two citations for illegally
parking her car in Ferguson, Missouri.1 She was given a $151 fine, plus fees.
She soon began struggling to make ends meet and went in and out of
homelessness.2 Unsurprisingly, she could not make payments on her parking
fine. Over the next three years, a local municipal court charged her seven
times with a Failure to Appear—a charge entailing arrest and new fines and
fees—due to missed payments and court dates.3 On two occasions, she tried
to make partial payments of $25 and $50, but the judge rejected these
payments because they did not completely cover the balance.4 By the time
that seven years had elapsed since the initial fine was imposed at $151, she
had paid $550 and still owed $541.5 She had been arrested twice and spent
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six days in jail for failures to appear in court and pay a fine that she could not
afford.6
The Department of Justice uncovered these facts while investigating the
police and courts of Ferguson, Missouri following the shooting of Michael
Brown.7 The findings are not news to anyone passing through the criminal
justice system.8 Today, the courts impose heavier-than-ever financial
burdens in the form of “carceral debt.”9 Carceral debt is comprised of user
fees,10 court costs, fines, and restitution.11 Though small in isolation, these
fees regularly result in thousands of dollars of debt to the individual.12 As in
Missouri, failure to pay these debts results in incarceration in many states,13
even though the Supreme Court has rejected “punishing a person for his
poverty.”14 And even when the Ferguson courts did not follow through with
incarceration, the threat alone forces the poor to scramble for a way to cough
up the cash.15 The result is a pay-or-stay system where the wealthy can buy
their freedom and the poor cannot.
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Id.
Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Justice Department Announces Findings of Two Civil Rights
Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-announces-findings-two-civil-rights-investigations-ferguson-missouri
[https://perma.cc/ZXP7-J4MN].
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 42 (“We have heard similar stories from dozens of
other individuals.”).
Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 349, 353 (2012) (defining “carceral debt” as “civil debt associated with criminal justice
penalties or debt incurred during incarceration, or both”); see also Michelle Alexander, THE NEW
JIM CROW (2012), at 153–53 (describing “preconviction service fees” such as jail book-in and public
defender fees, and post-conviction fees, including parole or probation service fees).
Cammett, supra note 9, at 353 (defining “user fees” as the government’s “attempt to recoup from
prisoners the operating costs of the criminal justice system”).
Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha & Rebekah Diller, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. AT N.Y.U. SCHOOL
OF L., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1–2 (2010) (surveying fifteen states with
the highest prison population in the country and finding that “[a]lthough ‘debtors’ prison’ is illegal
in all states, reincarcerating individuals for failure to pay debt is, in fact, common in some—and in
all states new paths back to prison are emerging for those who owe criminal justice debt”).
Cammett, supra note 9, at 354; see also Bannon, et al., supra note 11, at 1.
See ACLU, In For a Penny: The Rise of America’s New Debtors’ Prisons (2010),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/InForAPenny_web.pdf#page=6 [https://perma.cc/TEM63VTM] (profiling five states where persons were jailed for inability to pay carceral debts); Bannon,
supra note 11 (profiling fifteen states where criminal justice debt can lead to incarceration).
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983) (employing heightened scrutiny by relying on both
Equal Protection and Due Process).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 55 (“Ferguson uses its police department in large
part as a collection agency for its municipal court.”).
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This paper argues that many carceral debt practices today are subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.16
Traditionally, laws trigger heightened equal protection scrutiny when they
either inhibit a fundamental right or make a suspect classification.17 It is
settled that wealth classifications standing alone are not suspect.18 Over sixty
years ago, however, the Supreme Court announced a criminal protection for
the poor in Griffin v. Illinois: “In criminal trials[,] a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or
color.”19 The Court later extended Griffin in Bearden v. Georgia,20 by striking
down a law revoking probation solely for a person’s inability to pay probation
costs. There, the Court announced a new form of heightened scrutiny for
these laws, that resembles a balancing test: “a careful inquiry into such factors
as [1] the nature of the individual interest affected, [2] the extent to which it
is affected, [3] the rationality of the connection between legislative means
and purpose, and [4] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
purpose.”21
This paper offers a roadmap for relying on Bearden’s four-factor test to
challenge laws that discriminate against the poor. In Part I, the paper
explores the rules that Griffin and Bearden established. Griffin announced
broadly that “bolt[ing] the door to equal justice” based on ability to pay
violates the fundamental fairness of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Bearden
shaped this principle into a new form of heightened scrutiny that balances
four factors.23 Thus, the paper argues, whenever a law infringes a right solely
because of inability to pay, the law must face Bearden’s four-factor inquiry.
Part I draws these principles out from the cases.
16
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 115–16 (1996) (“Absent a fundamental interest or classification
attracting heightened scrutiny . . . the applicable equal protection standard is that of rational
justification.”).
See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22 (1973) (“The Court has not
held that fines must be structured to reflect each person’s ability to pay in order to avoid
disproportionate burdens.”); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (refusing to consider wealth
classifications to be like racial classifications).
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956).
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1983) (citations omitted).
Id.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666-67 (“[This issue] requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature
of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection
between legislative means and purpose, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
purpose.’”) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)). See also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519
U.S. 102 at 120–121 (1996) (“we inspect the character and intensity of the individual interest at
stake, on the one hand, and the State’s justification for its exaction, on the other.”).
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Part II of the paper rebuts two “shields” that advocates and jurists wield
to limit Bearden’s application in new contexts. Some, for example, find that
Bearden-style claims should be limited to criminal cases where a defendant is
incarcerated for inability to pay.24 Others argue that Bearden applies only
when challengers suffer an “absolute deprivation” of some right.25 Part II
rebuts those views and argues that their underlying concern—that properly
applying Bearden’s factors might open the floodgates of poverty litigation—is
largely unwarranted. This is so because Bearden balances the individual
interest affected with alternative means for achieving the stated goal. Under
this balancing test, a Bearden violation will not exist in the “mine run” of civil
cases.26 Part II concludes with a third case, M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,27 that supports
this rebuttal and illustrates the Bearden roadmap offered in Part I.
Despite Bearden and its related cases, the Ferguson investigation reveals
that many modern practices still incarcerate or punish the poor for their
poverty. Part III of the paper examines three such practices, arguing how
and why Bearden should apply. These three practices are (1) requiring indigent
persons to pay court appointed attorney fees, (2) assigning bail on a fixedsum basis, and (3) conditioning felon re-enfranchisement on payment of
carceral debt. The paper argues that the laws undergirding each of these
practices should be subjected to Bearden’s heightened scrutiny because they
inhibit a significant right based on inability to pay. The paper concludes that
the laws cannot stand under Bearden’s four-factor test.
I. DEVELOPING BEARDEN’S HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
In Ferguson, the courts filled the state’s coffers by imposing exorbitant
carceral debts on those convicted of petty offenses.28 The constitutional
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See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 749–750 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that Bearden only
requires courts to consider ability to pay when revoking probation and faulting the entire Griffin
case line for “fail[ing] to articulate a precise standard of review.”); see also J.T. Price, An Improper
Extension of Civil Litigation by Indigents: M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 905 (1997) (arguing that Bearden and Griffin’s principles should be constrained to claims by
criminal defendants); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 213 (1991) (arguing the same).
See, e.g., San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973); Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia, 901
F.3d 1245, 1261 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Rodriguez’s language as a reason not to apply Bearden).
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 43 (“[W]hile the municipal court does not have any
authority to impose a fine of over $1,000 for any offense, it is not uncommon for individuals to pay
more than this amount to the City of Ferguson—in forfeited bond payments, additional Failure to
Appear charges, and added court fees—for what may have begun as a simple code violation.”).
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problem with this scheme arises when the court issues arrest warrants and
threatens jail time to collect on carceral debts. In Ferguson, the courts were
converting code violations that were not “jail-worthy” on their own into jailworthy offenses solely due to inability to pay.29 In other words, the courts
punished the status of being poor. Under Griffin and Bearden, legal schemes
of this sort must face heightened scrutiny that resembles a balancing test
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. This section of the
paper outlines Griffin, Bearden, and their framework for challenging laws that
violate the rights of the poor solely because of inability to pay.
A. Griffin, Leading Up to Bearden
This story begins30 with Griffin v. Illinois.31 Griffin—an indigent person
convicted of a crime—wanted to appeal his conviction, but was unable to
afford the fee to procure a transcript of his trial.32 Without the transcript, he
could not make an appeal.33 Griffin filed a motion asking for the transcript
at no cost, alleging that he was a “poor person with no means of paying the
necessary fees.”34 The motion was denied, effectively denying his right to an
appeal.35 The Supreme Court overturned the Illinois law, explicitly relying
on both the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.36 The law violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it made a wrongful classification on the
basis of wealth: “Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate
review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”37
Likewise, Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence found the law to be a “money
hurdle,” no more defensible than requiring defendants to pay a flat fee to
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Id. at 43 (“[W]hile the municipal court does not generally deem the code violations that come before
it as jail-worthy, it routinely views the failure to appear in court to remit payment to the City as jailworthy, and commonly issues warrants to arrest individuals who have failed to make timely
payment.”).
See Bertram F. Wilcox & Edward J. Bloustein, The Griffin Case—Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment,
43 CORNELL L. Q. 1, 4 (1957) (writing, on the heels of Griffin, that “one might expect the law books
to be filled with decisions concerning the constitutional effects of poverty. In fact, the opposite is
true.”).
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
See id. at 18 ([A]t all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect
persons like petitioners from invidious discriminations.”).
Id. at 19.
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appeal.38 The Court concluded, “[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”39
Griffin and the cases that follow do not reflect the traditional Equal
Protection framework. The Court did not apply any of the traditional forms
of Equal Protection scrutiny—rational basis, strict scrutiny, and so forth.
Instead, the holding was constrained to the Illinois law at issue, finding that
it violated both the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.40 This confused some of the case’s early
commentators,41 leading them to accuse the Court of acting only on its “value
preferences.”42 But the Griffin Court rightly saw that wealth discrimination
is discrimination, equivalent to discrimination for “religion, race, or color.”43
In fact, the Court suggested that the Illinois law would fall even under
rational basis review: “[T]he ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
38

39
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43

Id. at 22–23 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Surely it would not need argument to conclude that a
State could not, within its wide scope of discretion in these matters, allow an appeal for persons
convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment of a year or more, only on payment of a fee of
$500.”). Frankfurter concurred largely to limit the potential scope of Griffin’s impact: “Of course a
State need not equalize economic conditions. A man of means may be able to afford the retention
of an expensive, able counsel not within reach of a poor man’s purse.” Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Insofar as Frankfurter feared that an indiscernible standard would open the floodgates
to poverty litigation, Bearden and M.L.B. responded by clarifying the standard of review that these
challenges will face.
Id. at 19.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (“[O]ur own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection
both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons
and different groups of persons.”).
Justice Harlan’s dissent, for example, assumed that the majority was engaging in a Substantive Due
Process analysis alone, despite its touting the Equal Protection violation. Id. at 36 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“I submit that the basis for [the plurality’s] holding is simply an unarticulated conclusion
that it violates ‘fundamental fairness’ . . . That of course is the traditional language of due process.”).
Others surmised that the Griffin Court was primarily concerned about a fundamental right at stake.
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 SUP. CT. REV.
41, 53-54 (1972) (“In equal protection terms, the cases can be rationalized as involving a legal
distinction between rich and poor touching on a fundamental matter, the interest in a fair trial and
appeal.”). This view was ultimately undercut by Bearden and M.L.B., neither of which relied on a
fundamental interest at stake.
Winter, supra note 41, at 58 (“So long as the Court continues to engage in the ad hoc process of
recognizing ‘fundamental interests,’ the number of interests can be endlessly expanded through
argument by analogy, which in turn depends almost entirely on the value preference of individual
Justices.”).
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17. This paper does not argue that Griffin or Bearden advance the strict scrutiny
standard for wealth classifications, even though racial classifications usually receive this treatment.
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (“It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny.”).
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relationship to a defendant’s guilt or innocence and could not be used as an
excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”44 But the Court did not employ
a standardized form of scrutiny, so Griffin did little to help later courts
measure the constitutionality of similar legal schemes.
While some scholars criticized Griffin as an expression of the Warren
Court’s judicial activism,45 the Court itself affirmed and expanded Griffin
through the 1970s and 80s.46 In Williams v. Illinois,47 a criminal defendant
could not pay a $505 fine for petty theft.48 After serving the one-year
maximum prison sentence for the crime, Williams was confined to prison
labor for 101 additional days to “work out” the debt at a rate of $5 per day.49
The Court found the law to work an “invidious discrimination” and struck it
down.50 The Court said that states “may not . . . subject a certain class of
convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory
maximum solely by reason of their indigency.”51 Sadly, the legal scheme in
Williams is too familiar. The Ferguson municipal code provided that when
carceral debts were unpaid, the nonpaying party must be imprisoned one
day for every $10.00 owed, not to exceed a total of four months.52 This
provision is almost identical to the “work out” provision struck down in
Williams. Even so, such practices persist today.
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Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17–18 (emphasis added). See also id. at 22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
judgement) (dismissing Illinois’s rationale that only defendants who can pay the fee for the
stenographic minutes can have their trial errors reviewed by the state Supreme Court).
See Klarman, supra note 24, at 289–290 (“The unpalatable aspect of fundamental rights equal
protection, in other words, was not its recognition of unenumerated rights, but its
reconceptualization of equal protection as an entitlement to affirmative governmental assistance.”);
see also Winter, supra note 41, at 100 (“Having no basis in the history or language of the Amendment
and lying well outside what seems the core area of judicial competence, it [the use of the Equal
Protection Clause to reduce economic inequality] finds sustenance solely in its alleged wisdom as
public policy.”).
See Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that when a criminal defendant has been held in
prison longer than the maximum sentence due to the failure to pay fines or court costs violates the
Equal Protection Clause); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that a town that holds a
traffic offender who could not pay his fines in prison at a rate of $5 per day until the $425 fine had
been paid violated the Equal Protection Clause); Bearden, 461 U.S. 660 (holding that a court
cannot revoke a defendant’s probation for failure to pay a fine unless the defendant was responsible
for not paying the fine and other forms of punishment are inadequate).
399 U.S. 235 (1970).
Id. at 236.
Id. at 236–37.
Id. at 242 (“On its face the statute extends to all defendants an apparently equal opportunity for
limiting confinement to the statutory maximum simply by satisfying a money judgment. In fact,
this is an illusory choice for Williams or any indigent who, by definition, is without funds.”).
Id. at 241–42.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 58 n.33.
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Williams’s framing of the Equal Protection violation mirrors that in
Griffin.53 Both laws impermissibly classified on ability to pay and locked up
those unable to pay.54 But also like Griffin, Williams offered little clarity as to
the standard of review applied when such a classification exists. Bearden filled
that gap.
B. Bearden’s Four-Factor Scrutiny
Bearden v. Georgia55 announced the enduring test for laws that punish the
poor for their poverty. Bearden pleaded guilty to burglary charges, but
because it was his first criminal offense, the trial court sentenced him to
probation, with a $500 fine and $250 total in restitution.56 Bearden was later
laid off his job. With a ninth grade education and being unable to read, he
could not find other work; paying the $550 remainder of his balance was out
of reach.57 When he failed to pay, the trial court revoked his probation,
entered a conviction, and sentenced him to serve his remaining probation
period in prison.58 The Supreme Court found that revoking probation for
failure to pay “is no more than imprisoning a person solely because he lacks
funds to pay the fine . . . .”59 In a unanimous decision, the Court overturned
the law under both the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.60
Bearden clarified a new level of heightened scrutiny for laws that target
indigent criminal defendants. As in Griffin, the law’s pay-or-stay provision
produced an impermissible classification; probationers either remained free
from jail or were locked up based only on inability to pay. In other words,
53
54

55
56
57
58
59
60

Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19 (“Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as
defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”).
The year after Williams, the Court decided Tate v. Short on similar grounds. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
In that case, an indigent defendant was incarcerated to “work off” an unpaid fine of $425. Id. at
397. Although Williams’s underlying crime—theft—called for a prison sentence, Tate’s minor
infraction—a traffic violation—did not. Because Tate’s underlying infraction called for a lesssevere punishment than that in Williams, the Court adopted the Williams rationale; the State cannot
“[impose] a fine as a sentence and then automatically convert[] it into a jail term solely because the
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” Id. at 398.
461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Id. at 662 n.1.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 674.
Id. at 665, 674. Justice White wrote the concurrence for four justices, rejecting the “superstructure
of procedural steps” imposed by the majority’s Equal Protection standard. Id. at 676 (White, J.,
concurring in judgement). Instead, he favored a looser test of whether, in revoking probation, the
judge made a “good faith effort” to impose a “roughly equivalent” jail sentence to the underlying
fine. Id. at 675 (White, J., concurring in judgement). The majority rejected both the presumption
of judicial good faith and the ambiguity of the “roughly equivalent” sentence. Id. at 673 n.12.
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the state “treated the petitioner differently from a person who did not fail to
pay the imposed fine and therefore did not violate probation.”61 Citing
Griffin, the Court stated that “[d]ue process and equal protection principles
converge in the Court’s analysis in these cases.”62 The Court refused the
“pigeonhole analysis” of applying the traditional levels of scrutiny under
Equal Protection.63 Instead, the Court imposed a factor-driven balancing
test: “This issue . . . requires a careful inquiry into such factors as [1] ‘the
nature of the individual interest affected, [2] the extent to which it is affected,
[3] the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose,
and [4] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose.’”64
This factor-driven inquiry is a tougher standard for laws to pass than that
traditional rational basis review, which asks only whether the law “bear[s]
some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”65 Thus, it is a new
form66 of heightened scrutiny for those laws that deprive rights to similarly
situated criminal defendants based only on ability to pay.
The Georgia law ultimately failed this new factor-driven heightened
scrutiny. Under the first and second factors, the individual interest was
obvious—“depriv[ing] the probationer of his conditional freedom.”67 Under
the third factor, the Court granted that “[t]he State, of course, has a
fundamental interest in appropriately punishing persons—rich and poor.”68
But absent a finding of whether Bearden could afford to pay probation costs,
there was no rational connection between the legislative means and purpose:
“Revoking the probation of someone who through no fault of his own is

61
62
63

64
65
66

67
68

Id. at 665.
Id.; see also id. at 666 n.8 (“fitting ‘the problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a
task too Procrustean to be rationally accomplished’”).
Id. at 665–67 (rejecting the parties’ attempt to “argu[e] the question primarily in terms of equal
protection, and debate vigorously whether strict scrutiny or rational basis is the appropriate
standard of review.”).
Id. at 666-67 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)) (Harlan, J., concurring).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
The Court purported not to “write on a clean slate” by examining Williams and Tate and even drew
the factors in its new heightened scrutiny from Williams. See Williams v. Ill., 399 U.S. 235, 259–60
(Harlan, J., concurring in the result) (articulating that William’s majority opinion holds that all
statutory classifications that are “suspect” or affect “fundamental rights” violate the Equal
Protection Clause unless there is a “compelling” government interest). Unlike Bearden, however,
Williams did not shape them into a form of heightened scrutiny.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
Id. at 669. The state also advanced two other interests; first, in ensuring payment of restitution to
crime victims; second, in rehabbing the probationer and protecting society from criminals. Id. at
670-71.
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unable to make restitution will not make restitution suddenly forthcoming.”69
And under the fourth factor, the Court found that Georgia’s interest in
punishment and deterrence could be effected fully by other means.70 The
Court found that the state could incarcerate Bearden for failure to pay, but
“[o]nly if the sentencing court determines that alternatives to imprisonment
are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the State’s interest in
punishment and deterrence.”71 In sum, the Court stated:
We hold, therefore, that in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine
or restitution, a sentencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure
to pay. . . . If the probationer could not pay despite sufficient bona fide
efforts to acquire the resources to do so, the court must consider alternate
measures of punishment other than imprisonment.72

Imposing these constraints on probation revocations, the Court
concluded, would curb the Equal Protection and Due Process violation
identified under Bearden’s heightened scrutiny.
Sadly, the wrong that Bearden aimed to prevent—punishing the poor for
their poverty—was not stamped out by its holding. In Ferguson, Missouri
that wrong was occurring just a few years ago. Recall that the woman in the
Ferguson investigation received only a citation for illegal parking, yet she
accrued over half a dozen arrest warrants, two arrests, and spent over six
days in jail.73 She was locked up only because she was unable to pay.74
Ferguson courts’ efforts to disguise the punishment for poverty as a
punishment for “fail[ing] to abide by the court’s rules” was unavailing.75 As
the Department of Justice stated, “Ferguson’s practice of automatically
treating a missed payment as a failure to appear—thus triggering an arrest
warrant and possible incarceration—is directly at odds with well-established
law that prohibits ‘punishing a person for his poverty.’”76 Freedom from
incarceration cannot be conditioned on ability to pay. Bearden’s protection is
needed now more than ever.
69
70

71
72
73

74
75
76

Id. at 670 (continuing, 670–71, “Indeed, such a policy may have the perverse effect of inducing the
probationer to use illegal means to acquire funds to pay in order to avoid revocation.”).
Id. at 671–72 (“For example, the sentencing court could extend the time for making payments, or
reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform some form of labor or public service in lieu
of the fine.”).
Id. at 672.
Id.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 4 (noting that Ferguson punishes defendants based
on their income level by not making an ability-to-pay determination, and enforcing severe penalties
for late payments, such as immediately issuing an arrest warrant).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 58 n.32.
Id. at 57 (citing Bearden v. Ga., 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983)).
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II. TWO SHIELDS AGAINST BEARDEN
Courts and advocates have long fended off Bearden and Griffin claims for
fear that the cases would lead to unconstrained poverty litigation.77 This fear
is not new. Justice Burton’s dissent in Griffin, for example, expressed fear that
the Court’s rationale could require states to equalize the quality of counsel
available to rich and poor litigants.78 When courts today want to avoid
Bearden’s heightened scrutiny, they typically employ two legal arguments—
shields to deflect Bearden’s use.79 This section explores those two shields,
outlines their weaknesses, and concludes with M.L.B. v. S.L.J., a Supreme
Court case that lays them to rest.
A. Shield One: Rodriguez and “Absolute Deprivations”
The first shield courts wield against Bearden is limiting language from San
Antonio v. Rodriguez, an inapposite case that predated Bearden.80 In Rodriguez,
the Court dismissed a challenge to public school funding based on the
property tax base.81 The case is often cited for the implication that there is
no substantive due process right to education.82 But plaintiffs made an
alternative claim, based on wealth classification. They claimed that the law
made a suspect classification against the poor by confining their children to
underfunded schools solely because of their lower neighborhood tax base.83

77

78

79
80
81
82
83

See, e.g., Wilcox & Blaustein, supra note 30, at 1–2 (“Although on its facts it [Griffin] involves solely a
poor man’s need of a transcript for appeal, its reasoning is broad enough to apply to many other of
the injustices arising from the poverty of litigants in our courts.”).
See id. at 30; Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12, 28 (1956) (Burton & Minton, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that
the Constitution does not require states to treat defendants as economic equals). The dissenting
Justices also noted that Griffin could be read to end the use of fixed bail rates for all accused—a
practice that, as this paper argues in Part III, should not stand under Bearden.
See Walker v. Calhoun, Ga., 901 F.3d 1245, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2018) (applying the absolute
deprivation shield against Bearden to distinguish the case and uphold fixed-sum bail practices).
411 U.S. 1 (1973). See Walker 901 F.3d at 1261 (citing Rodriguez’s language as a reason not to apply
Bearden).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
Id. at 38, 40.
Id. at 19 (restating—and ultimately rejecting—the District Court’s finding that, “since, under the
traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people receive less expensive
educations than other more affluent people, these systems discriminate on the basis of wealth.”).
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The trial court accepted this claim,84 but the Supreme Court did not,
recasting the Griffin cases significantly:
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class
discriminated against in our prior cases [such as Griffin] shared two
distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they were
completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy
that benefit.85

This language both limits and expands Griffin. It expands Griffin (and its
progeny, Bearden) by what it omits: that the petitioners in Griffin, Williams,
and, later, Bearden were criminal defendants. In other words, under Rodriguez,
Griffin-style claims are not limited to situations where the petitioner is a
criminal defendant. Such claims may lie even when incarceration is not at
stake. As explained in Subsection B. below, this view is not uniformly
accepted, but it is correct. Rodriguez, however, also limited Griffin to those
claims where the plaintiff suffers an “absolute deprivation.”86 The Court
found that, since the Rodriguez plaintiffs still had access to some schooling—
albeit unequal to that of their richer neighbors—they did not suffer an
“absolute deprivation” of their right to education.87 As such, the Court
surmised that Griffin never meant to protect this class of persons.
Bearden, however, later laid to rest the Rodriguez Court’s requirement that
there be an “absolute deprivation” of a right. Bearden’s first factors examines
“the extent to which [a private interest] is affected,”88 rather than simply
whether that private interest was “absolutely deprived.” Bearden states that
any deprivation—even one that is not “absolute”—should be weighed against
the means-end rationality of the law and alternative means for achieving the
law’s purpose.89 In Rodriguez, after the Court found that Rodriguez was not
absolutely deprived of the right to education, the Court’s ended its analysis

84

85
86
87

88
89

Id. at 16 (“Finding that wealth is a ‘suspect’ classification and that education is a ‘fundamental’
interest, the District Court held that the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could
show that it was premised upon some compelling state interest.”).
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–21, 23.
Id. at 23 (“The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low assessable
property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a poorer
quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth.”).
Bearden v. Ga., 461 U.S. 660, 660–67 (1983) (emphasis added).
See id. at 666–67 (“[This issue] requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘the nature of the
individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection
between legislative means and purpose, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the
purpose . . . .’”) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)).
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under Griffin and its progeny.90 After Bearden, the inquiry cannot end there;
the law must be subjected to all of Bearden’s factors to determine if an Equal
Protection violation exists.
B. Shield Two: Bearden Is for Incarceration Cases Only
The second shield that Bearden’s detractors employ is the view that Griffin
and Bearden should apply only when an indigent person faces incarceration
for their failure to pay.91 Many lower courts,92 policy groups,93 and state
laws94 interpret Bearden as only applying to laws that lead to incarceration.
These readers ignore the first factor of Bearden’s heightened scrutiny,95 which
asks whether the law burdens any “individual interest” because of inability to
pay, not just the individual’s liberty interest in freedom from incarceration.96
On the one hand, there are easy cases when Bearden can be applied in a
straightforward fashion. For example, indigent defendants recently
challenged an Arizona drug court program that would not release them from

90

91

92

93

94

95
96

See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23 (“[N]either appellees nor the District Court addressed the fact that,
unlike each of the foregoing cases, lack of personal resources has not occasioned an absolute deprivation
of the desired benefit. The argument here is not that the children in districts having relatively low
assessable property values are receiving no public education; rather, it is that they are receiving a
poorer quality education than that available to children in districts having more assessable wealth.”)
(emphasis added).
See, e.g., Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1145, 1171 (D. Or. 2018) (“What [Griffin, Bearden,
and M.L.B.] teach is that the ‘fundamental fairness’ principles of due process and equal protection
originating in Griffin have been applied when either incarceration or access to the courts, or both,
is at stake.”); Latonik v. Florida Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, No. 6:14-CV-1793ORL, 2014 WL 7010737, *4 (M.D. Fla., Dec. 11, 2014) (“A determination of the defendant’s ability
to pay is only necessary when the state seeks to enforce the collection of costs through the threat of
imprisonment.”).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that Bearden only requires
courts to consider ability to pay when revoking probation and faulting the entire Griffin case line for
“fail[ing] to articulate a precise standard of review.”)
E.g., NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES AND BAIL PRACTICES, Principles on Fines, Fees, and Bail
Practices, Principle 6.3 (2017), (recommending that, since Bearden, state courts must consider ability
to pay only when revoking probation).
E.g., ALA. R. CRIM. PRO. § 26.11(h)(1) (requiring courts to consider ability to pay only when
imposing fines, costs, and restitution that could lead to incarceration); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13810(E)(1) (making such considerations discretionary, rather than mandatory); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 771.3(6)(b) (allowing judges to impose carceral debts without considering ability to pay, while
burdening defendants to petition for remission); see also Bannon, supra note 11, at 13 (finding that
14 of 15 states surveyed have at least one statutorily mandatory carceral debt that cannot be
modified for inability to pay).
See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 24, at 264 (focusing on how Bearden “created affirmative governmental
obligations to redress poverty not directly attributable to the state.”).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67.
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restrictive drug court supervision until they fully paid the program fees.97
The case was analogous to Bearden in many ways: participants’ conditional
liberty was at stake; they could be immediately incarcerated for failure to
comply; and their release from the program was conditioned on ability to
pay.98 The court correctly applied Bearden and struck down the law under
heightened scrutiny.99
Other cases are not so easy, however. Consider whether Bearden should
apply to laws that revoke a driver’s license for the driver’s failure to pay court
fines and fees. Unlike Bearden, the “interest” at stake is the loss of a driver’s
license (not conditional liberty), and the persons are not criminal defendants.
Recent Bearden-style challenges to these laws produced mixed results. In
Thomas v. Haslam,100 a district court—despite stating that Bearden and Griffin
were on point—subjected the law to rational basis review, rather than
Bearden’s four factors.101 The Thomas court struck down the law, however,
finding that there was no rational relationship between license revocation
and the state’s interest in debt collection.102 By contrast, the Sixth Circuit
addressed an identical law in a separate suit and refused to apply Bearden
because there was no “fundamental liberty interest” at stake.103 The Sixth
Circuit employed the second shield against Bearden in classic fashion: “Bearden,
then, concerns what kind of process is due before a probationer is subject to
confinement, not what kind of process is due before a driver’s license is subject

97
98
99

100
101

102

103

Briggs v. Montgomery, No. CV-18-02684-PHX-EJM, 2019 WL 2515950, *1 (D. Ariz., June 18,
2019).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *10 (employing Bearden’s four-factor heightened scrutiny as outlined above because “[c]laims
alleging ‘categorically worse treatment for the indigent’ require a ‘hybrid analysis of equal
protection and due process principles.’”) (citing Walker v. City of Calhoun, Ga., 901 F.3d 1245,
1261 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom.)
Thomas v. Haslam, 329 F. Supp. 3d 475, 475 (M.D. Tenn. 2018) (striking down the license
revocation scheme).
Id. at 518 (“[O]ne could imagine the rational relationship that might exist between the threat of
license revocation and the legitimate interest of collecting court debt. That connection, though,
falls apart where indigent debtors are concerned.”).
Id. Revoking a driver’s license typically makes a person less able to pay their debts, after all. See id.
at 490-91 (concluding that “in Memphis, Nashville, and Knoxville, 72% to 75% of jobs are not
accessible by public transportation within 90 minutes” and that “in Nashville, Knoxville, and
Chattanooga, more than two thirds of working-age residents lack access to public transportation.”).
Fowler v. Benson, 924 F.3d 247, 260 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he district court correctly distinguished
the Griffin cases from Plaintiffs’ claims because none of the Griffin cases concerned a property
interest. Those cases dealt with basic features of the criminal justice system—imprisonment,
probations, and appeals.”).
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to suspension.”104 The Sixth Circuit applied rational basis review—as in
Thomas—but upheld the law.105 The Thomas court resides in the Sixth
Circuit, so that case is now likely abrogated by Fowler. This is a shame since
the Thomas court came closer to getting Bearden right.106
The two driver’s license cases show how unpredictably courts wield the
incarceration-only shield against Bearden in non-criminal cases. The Thomas
court rightly recognized that Bearden should apply when any individual right
is infringed, but the court failed to follow through and apply Bearden’s factordriven heightened scrutiny. Oddly, the court struck down the law under
rational basis review. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit was openly hostile
to even applying Bearden to a case where no liberty interest was at stake.107
And under rational basis review, the law stood.108
Ultimately, the uncertainty around how to apply Bearden stems from the
simultaneously broad and narrow scope of the Bearden cases themselves; they
addressed the sweeping problem of “punishing a person for his poverty,”109
while tailoring the opinion to the “treatment of indigents in our criminal justice

104

105

106

107

108
109

Id. at 261 (emphasis added). This view misses the mark on two fronts: Bearden should not be limited
to the criminal context because it addressed any “individual interest affected,” not just criminal
interests. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67. And Bearden relied on both the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses, rather than due process alone. Id. at 666.
Fowler, 924 F.3d at 262–63 (“Plaintiffs maintain that suspending the driver’s license of an indigent
license holder for nonpayment is patently irrational because doing so makes it harder for him to
obtain and hold a job, which in turn makes him less likely to pay his court debt. Perhaps Plaintiffs
are right that the policy is unwise, even counterproductive. But under rational basis review we ask
only whether Michigan’s statutes are ‘rationally related to legitimate government interests.’”) (citing
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Both cases purported to rely on Johnson v. Bredesen, which addressed a law conditioning felon
voting re-enfranchisement on complete payment of fines and fees. 624 F.3d at 746. But the Thomas
court openly disagreed with the logic of Johnson: “The Sixth Circuit, in Johnson . . . applies its own
gloss on Bearden, assuring the reader that, whatever the Supreme Court said, what it meant was that
the Court was applying heightened scrutiny because the fundamental right to physical liberty was
at issue. It is difficult for this court to see how Bearden supports such a reading.” Thomas, 329 F.
Supp. 3d at 515 (citations omitted). Part III of this paper addresses Johnson and rebuts its rationale
for the same reason.
The Sixth Circuit view may be gaining traction. See Mendoza v. Garrett, 358 F.Supp.3d 1145,
1169 (D. Or. 2018) (agreeing with Fowler because “[Bearden] cases have all arisen in the context of
the criminal justice system where fundamental rights of liberty are implicated.”). Other litigation
by groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center are dismissed on procedural or jurisprudential
grounds, especially when plaintiffs’ licenses have been revoked for multiple reasons. See Cook v.
Taylor, No. 2:18-CV-977-WKW, 2019 WL 1938794, *1 (M.D. Ala., May 1, 2019) (dismissing case
for lack of standing when plaintiffs’ licenses were revoked for failure to appear in court, as well as
failure to pay fines).
Id. at 263.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671. See also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16 (addressing the sweeping problem of
“providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike . . . .”).
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system.”110 This perhaps left open the question of whether Bearden applies
beyond those cases where indigent persons face incarceration. Rodriguez
moved in the direction of recognizing that Griffin and Bearden should apply to
any deprivation of rights. But it was not until M.L.B. that the Court clarified
that Bearden’s heightened scrutiny applies to criminal, “quasi-criminal,” and
even some civil cases when a law withholds an individual’s rights “solely by
reason of their indigency.”111
C. M.L.B. Clears the Air
In M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,112 a mother’s parental rights were permanently
terminated following a Mississippi Chancery Court proceeding. The
mother, M. L. B., filed an appeal but was unable to pay the mandatory
record preparation fee, estimated at over $2,300.113 Even though it was a
civil, rather than criminal case, the Court struck down the fee114 by applying
Bearden’s test.115 First, the Court reiterated the basics of Equal Protection:
absent either a fundamental interest or a suspect classification, the law must
face rational basis review.116 But the Court noted two exceptions to this
general rule: “The basic right to participate in political processes as voters
and candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license. Nor
may access to judicial processes in cases criminal or ‘quasi criminal in nature’
turn on ability to pay.”117 But it was not until M.L.B. that the Court clarified
that Bearden’s heightened scrutiny applies to criminal, “quasi criminal,” and

110

111
112
113
114
115

116

117

Bearden, 461 U.S. at 664 (emphasis added); see also Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17–18 (“In criminal trials a
State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.
Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant’s guilt or
innocence and could not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”). Bearden
pleaded guilty to burglary and theft by receiving stolen property. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 660. Griffin
was convicted of armed robbery. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1970)).
519 U.S. 102 (1996).
Id. at 109.
Id. at 124.
The Court was also clearer in M.L.B. than in Bearden as to how the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses function together: “The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of
fencing out would-be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs . . . . The due
process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state-ordered proceedings anterior to
adverse state action.” Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
Id. at 115–16 (“Absent a fundamental interest or classification attracting heightened scrutiny . . .
the applicable equal protection standard ‘is that of rational justification’ . . . .”) (citing Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973)) (per curiam).
Id. at 124 (emphasis added) (citing Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196 (1971)).
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even some civil cases when a law withholds an individual’s rights solely
because of inability to pay.118
In defining the “quasi criminal” category, the Court relied on Mayer v.
Chicago.119 There, the Court struck down a law requiring an indigent criminal
defendant to pay an appeal fee.120 Mayer was convicted of a petty offense,
not subject to the threat of incarceration.121 Even so, the M.L.B. Court found
that Bearden’s core concern was implicated when the defendant’s inability to
pay could bar his access to “appellate processes from even [the State’s] most
inferior courts.”122 The Court granted that Mayer’s inability to pay for an
appeal only affected “his professional prospects,” including whether he could
practice medicine.123 If Mayer—with so little an individual interest at stake—
justified Bearden-style scrutiny, the Court reasoned that Bearden should apply
to M.L.B., where parental rights were at stake. Likewise, the Court
characterized Bearden as quasi criminal because the law “fenc[ed] out wouldbe appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs.”124 These cases
all fell within a “narrow category of civil cases in which the State must
provide access to its judicial processes without regard to a party’s ability to
pay court fees.”125
The Court then applied Bearden’s heightened scrutiny.126 In so doing, the
M.L.B. Court rejected the second shield against Bearden described above—
that Griffin and Bearden should apply only when an indigent person faces
incarceration.127 The Court explicitly concluded that “Griffin’s principle has
not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake.”128 Rather,
the key fact is that the laws in Mayer, the poll tax cases, and Bearden were
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

127

128

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124 (1996).
404 U.S. 189 (1971).
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124. See Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196 (“The size of the defendant’s pocketbook bears
no more relationship to his guilt or innocence in a nonfelony than in a felony case.”).
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 121 (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197).
Id. at 112 (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197).
Id. at 121.
Id. at 120. See also id. at 119 (finding Bearden applied because M. L. B. faced the termination of her
parental rights, an issue typically appealable, “but for her inability to advance required costs”).
Id. at 113.
Id. at 120–21 (“In line with those decisions, we inspect the character and intensity of the individual
interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State’s justification for its exaction, on the other.”) (citing
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1983)).
Some commentators were outraged that M.L.B. destroyed what they considered to be a bright line
distinction restricting Griffin and Bearden to the criminal context. See Price, supra note 24, at 914
(arguing that Bearden and Griffin’s principles should be constrained to claims by criminal defendants).
But these scholars failed to see that Bearden applies whenever any “individual interest” is infringed
solely based on inability to pay. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 111.
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“wholly contingent on one’s ability to pay, and thus ‘visit[ed] different
consequences on two categories of persons,’ they apply to all indigents and
do not reach anyone outside that class.”129 M.L.B. fit the bill as well, so
Bearden’s scrutiny applied.
The M.L.B. Court also laid to rest the first shield against Bearden.
Contrary to Rodriguez, the Court did not limit its consideration to whether the
indigent mother suffered an “absolute deprivation” of some right.130 Rather,
it was enough that the State sought to sever M. L. B.’s parental rights. This
individual interest was significant, and it was infringed “solely because of
inability to pay,” so the Court employed Bearden’s heightened scrutiny.131
Under the first prong, the Court examined the gravity of the parental
relationship and the extent to which that relationship was affected by her
inability to pay.132
Because of “the primacy of the parent-child
133
relationship,” the Court found that “the stakes for petitioner . . . are large,
‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’”134 The Court then weighed the
loss of parental rights against the state’s interest in recouping court costs.135
The state’s interest was found wanting.136
Even though Bearden applies when non-incarceration rights are infringed,
there is no cause for alarm that M.L.B. opens the floodgates to poverty
litigation. M.L.B.’s dissenters, for example, argued that expanding Bearden to
civil claims would expose every government-provided service to challenge.137
This view loses sight of the fact that, even after M.L.B., the burden on Bearden

129

130
131
132
133
134
135

136
137

Id. at 127 (citations omitted). The Court also rejected the argument that the law at issue should be
challenged under the disparate-impact theory. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976)
(establishing the disparate impact framework).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1972).
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113.
Id. at 121. While the Court identified the parental interest at stake as “fundamental,” the holding
was not based on that conclusion.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 121 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)).
Id. at 120–21 (“In line with [Bearden and] those decisions, we inspect the character and intensity of
the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and the State’s justification for its exaction, on the
other.”).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 138 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Griffin line of cases ascribed to—one might say
announced—an equalizing notion of the Equal Protection Clause that would, I think, have startled
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers. . . . In [Washington v.] Davis, among other cases, we began
to recognize the potential mischief of a disparate impact theory writ large, and endeavored to
contain it. In this case, I would continue that enterprise.”). See generally Price, supra note 23, at 914
(arguing that Bearden and Griffin’s principles should be constrained to claims by criminal defendants).
But see M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 127 (rejecting the view that Washington and disparate impact cases
controlled this case).
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challengers is high. Indigent persons challenging laws that punish the poor
must still face Bearden’s scrutiny, which requires the interest infringed to
overcome the state’s interest.138 M.L.B. met this test because the private
interest at stake “involve[d] the awesome authority of the State ‘to destroy
permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship.’”139 But most
“mine run civil actions” will not rise to this level.140 And the individual
interest is one factor among four, including the state’s interest in the fee
structure, the means-end rationality of the law, and the viability of any
alternative fee collection means.141 It is unlikely, as one court feared, that an
indigent person’s “right” to reduced postage stamps will outweigh the other
factors in favor of reduced postage prices for persons who are poor.142
The woman discussed in the Ferguson investigation was jailed twice for
her failure to pay carceral debts.143 Apparently this practice was routine.144
As the Department of Justice noted, Bearden directly prohibits jailing the poor
solely for their inability to pay.145 But M.L.B. clarified that Bearden should not
be cabined to those cases where the defendant faces incarceration. Instead,
Bearden applies whenever an individual interest is burdened due to inability
to pay. If so, the law at issue must face Bearden’s four-factor inquiry.146

138

139

140
141

142
143
144

145
146

See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123 (finding that only where the interest potentially infringed overcomes a
“rational” state interest in covering state’s costs will courts grant access to transcripts or stateappointed counsel).
Id. at 128 (citing Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987)). While the Court noted that the
parental right, generally, is a fundamental interest, the Court did not rely on that fact to conclude
that Bearden should apply. See id. (citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Services of Durham Cnty., 452
U.S. 18 (1981)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)).
Id. at 127.
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 600, 666–67 (1983) (“[T]he issue . . . requires a careful inquiry into
such factors as ‘the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the
rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, and the existence of alternative
means for effectuating the purpose.’”) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1262 (11th Cir. 2018) (offering this hypothetical as a
reason to refuse to apply Bearden).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 4.
Id. at 55 (“With extremely limited exceptions, every warrant issued by the Ferguson municipal court
was issued because: 1) a person missed consecutive court appearances, or 2) a person missed a single
required fine payment as part of a payment plan.”).
Id. at 57 (finding that the practices at issue were “directly at odds with well-established law that
prohibits ‘punishing a person for his poverty.’”) (citing Bearden, 461 U.S. at 671).
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (listing the four factors: nature of the individual interest affected,
the extent to which the nature of the interest is affected, the rationality between the legislative means
and purpose, and existence of alternate means to affect the purpose).
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III. THREE CARCERAL DEBT CHALLENGES AFTER BEARDEN
This paper now turns to several common state practices hurting the poor
that are ripe for challenge under Bearden. To be sure, plaintiffs fight an uphill
battle against “the general rule . . . that fee requirements ordinarily are
examined only for rationality.”147 But Ferguson illustrates that many courts
enforce carceral debts with the threat of incarceration—even when the
underlying offense could not have led to imprisonment.148 This practice
clearly violates Equal Protection and Due Process under Bearden. Likewise,
this paper argues that the following examples fall within Bearden’s scope
because challengers allege the violation of a significant interest solely due to
inability to pay.149 These examples also fall within the categories where
M.L.B. stated that Bearden should apply—access to the political process and
access to judicial process in cases criminal or quasi-criminal.150 These claims
should succeed under Bearden’s four-factor test.151
A. Court-Appointed Defender Fees
Today, about 80% of state criminal defendants and 66% of federal
criminal defendants require appointed counsel.152 It has been settled since
Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent defendants deserve access to adequate legal
representation.153 But barely a decade after Gideon, the Court curtailed this
right. In Fuller v. Oregon, the Supreme Court found that indigent defendants
could be required to repay the costs of their court appointed attorneys.154
Fuller should not be read overbroadly. The Court’s upholding the Oregon

147
148

149
150
151

152
153
154

M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996).
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. C.R. DIV., supra note 1, at 43 (“[W]hile the municipal court does not generally
deem the code violations that come before it as jail-worthy, it routinely views the failure to appear
in court to remit payment to the City as jail-worthy, and commonly issues warrants to arrest
individuals who have failed to make timely payment.”).
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (setting forth the four factor test for when an individual faces a
burden due to an inability to pay).
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124.
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (“[This] issue requires a careful inquiry into such factors as [1]
‘the nature of the individual interest affected, [2] the extent to which it is affected, [3] the rationality
of the connection between legislative means and purpose, and [4] the existence of alternative means
for effectuating the purpose . . . .”) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 (1970)) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
Helen A. Anderson, Penalizing Poverty: Making Criminal Defendants Pay for Their Court-Appointed Counsel
Through Recoupment and Contribution, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 329 (2009).
See 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (establishing an indigent criminal defendant’s right to state-funded
defense at trial).
417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974).
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law was contingent upon the law’s built-in safeguards.155 The law only
imposed defender fees on those who, despite being indigent at trial, later
gained means to pay.156 The law also required the court to offer a hearing on
the defendant’s ability to pay his defender fees.157 A defendant could avoid
the obligation to pay if the court found him unable to do so.158 And most
importantly, plaintiffs did not make a Griffin-style Equal Protection claim,
and the case predated Bearden.159 Thus, the Court refused to address whether
the law would fall under such a challenge.160 In light of Bearden, Fuller’s
holding is in serious doubt.161
Even so, many states overread Fuller, broadly imposing defender fees as a
condition of release from parole or supervision.162 A recent study by the
Brennan Center indicates that, among thirteen of the fifteen states surveyed
impose defender fees163: “This practice can push defendants to waive
counsel, raising constitutional questions and leading to wrongful
convictions.”164 Many states tailor their laws to thread the needle of Due
Process and Equal Protection requirements laid out in Bearden and other
relevant cases.165 In other states, however, defendants can be incarcerated

155

156
157
158
159
160
161

162
163

164
165

See Anderson, supra note 152, at 337–38 (noting that the Fuller court upheld the Oregon statute
because it only imposed the obligation to pay upon defendants who could meet the burden without
hardship).
Fuller, 417 U.S. at 46.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. at 48 n.9.
Id.
See Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1984) (reinterpreting Fuller’s significance in
light of Bearden to produce “five basic features of a constitutionally acceptable attorney’s fees
reimbursement program . . . .”).
See id. at 125. (restating the North Carolina statute’s requirement that court appoint counsel fees
as a condition for parole).
BANNON ET AL., supra note 11, at 12 (“In North Carolina, the court must order convicted
defendants to pay a $50 fee and must direct a judgment to be entered for the full value of the defense
services provided, currently valued at $75/hour for non-capital cases, plus additional fees and
expenses. In Virginia, poor defendants may be charged as much as $1,235 per count for certain
felonies.”).
Id. at 1.
Shortly after Bearden, for instance, the Fourth Circuit upheld a North Carolina scheme that
conditioned parole on payment of defender fees. Johnson, 742 F.2d at 126. There, “[t]he
interlocking statutes and court decisions that regulate” the recoupment scheme provided judges
discretion to lower defender fee amounts based on inability to pay, and the parolees could appeal
the determination of whether they were indigent for purposes of repayment. Id. at 125–26.
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simply for inability to pay for their court-appointed attorney, perpetuating
modern “debtors’ prisons.”166
Those courts upholding the practice of imposing defender fees have
allowed Fuller to swallow the rule established in the Bearden cases.167 Today,
defender fee laws in most states lack the protections for indigent defendants
present in Fuller. In three out of fifteen states surveyed, the Brennan Center
exposed that defender fees are mandatory by statute, with no possibility of
waiver.168 These states cannot hide behind Fuller, which permits only nonmandatory defender fees that consider ability to pay.169 And even in those
jurisdictions that do consider ability to pay before imposing defender fees,
there is still little “rationality of . . . connection between legislative means and
purpose.”170 Studies reveal that recoupment schemes do not achieve their
goal; counties expend great resources to try to recover these debts and the
collection rate is—unsurprisingly—very low.171 A state’s overspending on
the unlikely chance that they may recover defender fees is not rational.172
Laws making the failure to pay defender fees punishable by incarceration
fare even worse under Bearden. Jailing poor defendants for their inability to
pay defender fees directly parallels the harm in Bearden; the state has
“impos[ed] a fine as a sentence and then automatically conver[ted] it into a
jail term.”173 These laws must face Bearden’s heightened scrutiny.174 Under
166

167

168
169
170
171

172
173
174

See NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES AND BAIL PRACTICES, supra note 93, at 7 (finding that
courts should not sentence defendants to prison for their inability to pay court fees in absence of a
hearing and a justified situation); Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense
Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2013) (arguing that there exists a two-tiered justice system
based upon income level and inadequate access to legal counsel perpetuates this phenomena).
E.g., State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 109 (Alaska 1995) (upholding law authorizing judgment to collect
attorney fees without determination of ability to pay because “we conclude that James and Fuller do
not require a prior determination of ability to pay in a recoupment system which treats recoupment
judgment debtors like other civil judgment debtors . . . .”).
See Bannon, supra note 11, at 12 (pointing to Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia).
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 54 (1974).
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 600, 667 (1983).
See Anderson, supra note 152, at 332 (“A 1984 Justice Department study revealed that less than 10
percent of recoupment orders were collected. Furthermore, a 1986 study showed that while it is
possible for revenues to exceed costs in a tightly run and carefully administered recoupment
program, in most instances recoupment programs were not cost-effective.”).
See id. (“The recoupment program reviewed by the Supreme Court in a 1972 case spent $400,000
collecting $17,000 over two years.”).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667 (citations omitted).
Challengers could also argue for strict scrutiny, since a fundamental right is at stake, but this type
of claim is beyond the scope of this paper. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (“[The law at issue] could not withstand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court
has found appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental
constitutional rights or that involve suspect classifications.”) (citations omitted).
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this scrutiny, the state’s interest in recouping defender fees is insubstantial
compared to a defendant’s freedom from incarceration.175 This is to say
nothing of the alternative punishment and collection methods available to
the state. And other states try an end-run on Fuller by assessing ability to pay
only after defendants challenge their defender fee debts—a post-deprivation
hearing.176 But the law in Fuller was upheld only because it required a predeprivation hearing that assessed ability pay before imposing the fee. Absent
such a finding, states cannot claim that their interest in imposing defender
fees outweighs the penalties that criminal defendants face. Thus, they fail
Bearden’s heightened scrutiny.
B. Bail and Pretrial Detention
The second practice that should end under Bearden is the imposition of
fixed-sum bail. Nearly two thirds of all inmates in county jails are defendants
awaiting trial.177 The majority of these inmates are indigent, non-felony
offenders.178 One solution to the unmanageable growth of pretrial detention
population numbers is to directly reduce the number of pretrial detainees.
New Jersey179 and New York,180 for example, both recently passed laws
175

176

177

178
179

180

In Bearden, the Court addressed criminal fines whose purpose was punishment. As such, the Court
felt that there may be circumstances where revoking probation is justified because “alternative
measures are not adequate to meet the State’s interests in punishment and deterrence . . . .”
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672. This is not the case for defender fees, where the fee’s only purpose is
recouping state funds. See also James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 139 (1972) (“If acquitted, the indigent
finds himself obligated to repay the State for a service the need for which resulted from the State’s
prosecution.”).
Anderson, supra note 152, at 345 (“In Washington, fees for appointed counsel on appeal
automatically become part of the judgment and sentence against the defendant if the defendant
does not object to the state’s cost bill. Even if the defendant objects, no pre-imposition
determination of ability to pay is required . . . .”) (citation omitted).
Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Speech at the National
Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-speaks-national-symposium-pretrial-justice
[https://perma.cc/TB5NQ4DV].
Id.
See Nicholas Pugliese, Did NJ Bail Reform Cause a Surge in Crime? Court Analysis Says No,
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Apr. 2, 2019, 5:20 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/newjersey/2019/04/02/nj-bail-reform-no-crime-surge-pretrial-release/3336423002/
[https://perma.cc/N853-Z85J] (outlining the New Jersey law that allows judges to make individual
risk assessments of defendants before deciding to release them on bail and noting that the law has
not caused a spike in crime and has decreased the racial disparity in New Jersey jails).
New York’s law went into effect in January 2020, producing a 30% decrease in New York City’s
jail population. MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL
REFORM REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK’S AMENDED BAIL LAW ON PRETRIAL
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preventing pretrial detention for almost anyone charged with a misdemeanor
or nonviolent felony. These measures have reduced the state costs of pretrial
detention, with no measured increase in crime rates.181 The United States
Attorney General’s office proposed a more modest reform: eliminate “fixedsum” bail.182 Fixed sum bail is the practice of automatically assigning bail
rates based on the charged offense.183 The Attorney General’s proposed
system would consider the charged offense alongside two other factors: the
danger that the accused poses to society and the risk that they may flee before
trial. In this regard, bail rates would not be “fixed.” Recent litigation has
taken up the battle against fixed-sum bail.184
Fixed-sum bail challenges rely on Griffin and its progeny as well as Pugh v.
Rainwater,185 a critical Fifth Circuit opinion. In Pugh, Florida plaintiffs
challenged their pretrial detention based on their inability to pay money
bail.186 Drawing on Griffin, Williams, and Tate,187 the panel subjected the bail
scheme to strict scrutiny and found “a presumption against money bail and

181

182

183
184

185
186
187

DETENTION
1
(May
2020),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2020/bail_reform_revisit
ed_05272020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN36-PM4T].
GLENN A. GRANT, ACTING ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, 2018 REPORT TO
THE
GOVERNOR
AND
THE
LEGISLATURE
5
(Apr.
2019),
https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=taP [https://perma.cc/8V3NDK52] (“Notably, in 2014, 12.7 percent of defendants were charged with a new indictable crime
while on pretrial release, a number that remained consistently low, 13.7 percent, in 2017.”);
PRETRIAL JUST. INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 1 (Jan. 2017)
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFil
eKey=c2f50513-2f9d-2719-c990-a1e991a57303&forceDialog=0
[https://perma.cc/6VRBUZBM] (“Each day someone is in jail, the price of his or her food, medical care, and security
(excluding fixed building expenses) may be conservatively estimated at $85 a day.”). Data regarding
criminal acts committed by those not under pretrial detention under the new law in New York is
still being gathered. REMPEL & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 180, at 1 (noting that the bill had been
passed one month before the report was published and in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic).
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv34–
MHT-WC, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (No. 26), at 1 (arguing that any bail
scheme that madness pre-fixed amount payments for different offenses to gain pre-trial release is
unconstitutional and bad public policy).
Id.
See EQUAL JUST. UNDER L., Ending American Money Bail, https://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/moneybail-1 [https://perma.cc/QY9M-CFC2] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020) (finding that bail amounts are
significant of wealth status, not necessarily depending on flight risk or danger to society); Anna
Claire Vollers, Too Poor to Make Bail: Alabama Forced to Reform “Two-Tiered” Jail System, AL.COM (Oct.
11,
2017),
https://www.al.com/news/2017/10/too_poor_to_make_bail_alabama.html
[https://perma.cc/6NYZ-C2LQ] (detailing a lawsuit dismantling Alabama’s practice of assigning
bail by fixed schedule in seventy-five counties).
557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated en banc on other grounds, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
Pugh, 557 F.2d at 1190.
Id. at 1196–97.
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in favor of those forms of release which do not condition pretrial freedom on
an ability to pay.”188 During the pendency of appeal, Florida changed its law
to include an indigency determination in the first 48 hours of detention, so
the case was vacated as moot.189 But in the decision to moot the prior
holding, the en banc court approved of the prior panel’s rationale.190
Challengers today can draw on Pugh for the principle that, at the very least,
a court must consider the accused’s ability to pay within the first 48 hours of
detention.
There is now a circuit split in resolving these challenges. The Eleventh
Circuit, for example, recently refused to apply Bearden’s heightened scrutiny
to fixed bail schemes. In Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia,191 the court upheld
a law imposing fixed bail rates because the law provided a hearing on ability
to pay within the first 48 hours of pretrial confinement, if defendants
requested it.192 The court admitted that Pugh and Bearden were the guiding
cases193 but made three crucial mistakes in applying them. First, the court
assumed that Bearden merely “synthesized” the case law for indigent
defendants,194 rather than announcing a new test that laws musts face when
they criminalize poverty.195 Second, relying on Rodriguez’s limiting language,
the court incorrectly split hairs over the deprivation at issue: “Under the
Standing Bail Order, Walker and other indigents suffer no ‘absolute
deprivation’ of the benefit they seek, namely pretrial release. Rather, they
must merely wait some appropriate amount of time to receive the same

188
189

190

191
192
193
194
195

Id. at 1202.
Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978). This is a common practice; when litigants
challenge a local bail policy, the city will amend the policy immediately after the case’s filing. This
limits the amount of published case law on the issue. E.g., Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34–
MHT (WO), 2015 WL 5387219 at *4, *12 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (dismissing the case following
the city’s amended policy, but reiterating that “the use of a secured bail schedule to detain a person
after arrest, without an individualized hearing regarding the person’s indigence and the need for
bail or alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1056 (announcing “[a]t the outset” that the court “accept[ed] the principle that
imprisonment solely because of indigent status is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally
permissible.”).
901 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 1266.
Id. at 1265 (“Thus the district court was correct to apply the Bearden/Rainwater style of analysis for
cases in which ‘[d]ue process and equal protection principles converge.’”).
Id. at 1259.
The court also addressed M.L.B., but only in passing, and quoting a passage from the opinion that
countered an unrelated point: whether the claim was one of disparate impact and should fall subject
to the rule announced in Washington v. Davis. A deeper treatment of M.L.B. would reveal the
breadth of cases to which Bearden applies, countering the court’s overuse of the Rodriguez limiting
principle, as discussed in the next paragraph.
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benefit as the more affluent.”196 By this logic, the Supreme Court similarly
could have found that Bearden was not “absolutely deprived” of his personal
liberty while he was incarcerated for inability to pay probation costs; he was
merely locked up for an additional “appropriate amount of time.” The
Supreme Court did not adopt this view, so Rodriguez should not be read to
advance it.
Finally, the Walker court misunderstood the convergence of Due Process
and Equal Protection in the Bearden cases.197 In the same breath, the court
cited Bearden’s four-factor scrutiny, then said, “We take Bearden’s quotation of
Justice Harlan’s Williams concurrence as a sign that the Bearden court shared
his assessment that these kinds of questions should be evaluated along
something akin to a traditional due process rubric.”198 The Court then
applied Mathews v. Eldridge’s procedural due process analysis.199 It is
interpretive gymnastics to read a later case (here, Bearden), citing an earlier
case (Williams), as silently advancing a theory espoused by a single Justice in
the earlier case over and against what the later case plainly states.200 Further,
Bearden never cited to nor relied on Mathews. That Bearden’s test may resemble
due process analysis does not mean it should be replaced by Mathew’s more
general due process test. Bearden, not Mathews, provides the appropriate
framework for review for laws that target the poor. Even so, the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the law under “something akin to procedural due process”
alone.201 The court admitted its motivation for doing so; “the courts would
be flooded with litigation” under Bearden, including indigent postal customers
asserting a right to free express postage.202 Equating one’s right to pretrial
liberty with another’s desire to get discounted postage both is callous and
overstates the floodgates argument. Bearden’s four-factor scrutiny will insulate
“the mine run of cases” plaintiffs may bring.203 Only when a significant right
196
197

198
199
200

201
202
203

Id. at 1261.
Id. at 1264. The dissent correctly pointed out the intersection of harms when the right to freedom
is deprived based on inability to pay. Id. at 1278, n.8 (Martin, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Id. at 1265. This view is unprecedented and unsupported by the scholarly literature.
Id.; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665 (“Most decisions in this area have rested on an equal protection
framework, although Justice Harlan in particular has insisted that a due process approach more
accurately captures the competing concerns. . . . [W]e generally analyze the fairness of relations
between the criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while we approach
the question whether the State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit
available to another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
Walker, 901 F.3d at 1265.
Id. at 1262.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123.
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is at stake (here, conditional liberty) and the means-end rationality is
particularly weak are laws at risk of being struck down under Bearden.
The same year that Walker came down, the Fifth Circuit correctly applied
Bearden to affirm a preliminary injunction against a fixed-sum bail program
in Texas.204 Relying on the same precedent as Walker, the court found in
O’Donnell:
Both aspects of the Rodriguez analysis apply here: indigent misdemeanor
arrestees are unable to pay secured bail, and, as a result, sustain an absolute
deprivation of their most basic liberty interests—freedom from
incarceration. Moreover, this case presents the same basic injustice: poor
arrestees in Harris County are incarcerated where similarly situated wealthy
arrestees are not, solely because the indigent cannot afford to pay a secured
bond. Heightened scrutiny of the County’s policy is appropriate.205

The Fifth Circuit subjected the law to Bearden’s factors and it was found
wanting. The court found the first two factors to weigh solidly for the
plaintiff, considering the “most basic liberty interest” at stake.206 The court
also found no means-end rationality of the law, based on “empirical data and
studies [finding] that the County had failed to establish any ‘link between
financial conditions of release and appearance at trial or law-abiding
behavior before trial.’”207 Further, the court found persuasive other studies
showing that “the imposition of secured bail might increase the likelihood of
unlawful behavior.”208 Thus, the preliminary injunction against the law
stood. Later courts should follow the model of O’Donnell, rather than Walker
because it rightly applies Bearden, the commanding authority over these laws.
C. Felon Disenfranchisement
The third practice that should fall under Bearden is payment-contingent
felon re-enfranchisement. The Supreme Court has long held that the right

204
205
206

207
208

O’Donnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 162.
Id.; see Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (“[This issue] requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘[1]
the nature of the individual interest affected, [2] the extent to which it is affected, [3] the rationality
of the connection between legislative means and purpose, and [4] the existence of alternative means
for effectuating the purpose.’”).
O’Donnell, 892 F.3d at 162.
Id. (citing Paul Heaton et al., The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN.
L. REV. 711, 786–87 (2017)). See also ACLU, supra note 13 (noting that setting bail without regard
to one’s ability to pay may incentivize criminal behavior to pay bail costs); Cammett, supra note 9,
at 383.
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to vote is “the essence of a democratic society.”209 Still, the Fourteenth
Amendment specifically permits denial of the right to vote due to
“participation in rebellion, or other crime.”210 Today, those convicted of
felonies in all states except two lose their right to vote.211 The Supreme Court
affirmed this practice in Richardson v. Ramirez, by upholding a California law
that completely barred all felons from re-gaining the right to vote.212 Even
so, some states have tried to re-enfranchise former felons through legislation.
In 2018, Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment that
automatically restored the right to vote to the state’s 1.4 million felons who
had served their time.213 But four months later, the Florida Legislature
passed a contrary bill requiring complete payment of carceral debts before
restoring voting rights.214 This is a common practice today; rather than deny
re-enfranchisement altogether, many states condition voting restoration on
the complete payment of carceral debts.215

209

210
211
212

213

214
215

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s
choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart
of representative government.”); see also Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (“[W]ealth or fee paying has, in our
view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so
burdened or conditioned.”).
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2.
Cammett, supra note 9, at 350–51.
418 U.S. 24 (1974). Richardson’s Fourteenth Amendment holding is beyond the scope of this paper,
but it rested on the tension between the fundamental nature of the right to vote and the provision
in clause two of the Fourteenth Amendment that the right could be curtailed for criminals. Id. at
55 (“Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment], in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not
have been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from
the less drastic sanction of reduced representation which Section 2 imposed for other forms of
disenfranchisement.”).
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida (May 31, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-effortsflorida [https://perma.cc/XL6B-9BNJ]. Before this change, the Florida constitution permanently
disenfranchised citizens, granting only the governor the authority to restore voting rights. In his
first five years in office, Governor Rick Scott restored rights to fewer than 2,000 Floridians.
Id.
E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(a), (g) (2012) (stating that a person convicted of a crime who applies
for certificate of eligibility to register to vote must pay all fines, court costs, fees, and victim
restitution; persons convicted of certain crimes are not eligible to apply for certificate of eligibility
to register to vote); ARK. CONST. amend. 51, § 11(d)(2)(A) (requiring payment of probation fees,
court costs, fines, and restitution); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.045(2)(c) (2012) (requiring full
payment of restitution). Scholars also argue that these laws produce racially disproportionate
effects. See Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (2004) (“Virtually every contemporary discussion
of criminal disenfranchisement in the United States begins by noting the sheer magnitude of the
exclusion, and its racial salience.”).
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These pay-to-vote laws run headlong into Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections.216 In that case, the Supreme Court struck down a poll tax, requiring
voters to pay to register to vote.217 The Court stated, “[w]ealth, like race,
creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in
the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like
those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”218 Supporting this finding was
the Court’s conclusion that the right to vote is a “fundamental matter in a
free and democratic society.”219
There are two alternative methods for challenging these laws. The first
is a traditional Equal Protection challenge based on the fundamental right at
stake. Harper made clear that the right to vote is fundamental, and infringing
fundamental rights typically triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause alone.220 This claim does not require relying on Bearden at
all.221
More relevant here, pay-to-vote laws are also subject to challenge under
Bearden, for those ex-felons who cannot afford to pay off their carceral debts.
M.L.B. stated outright that laws placing a price tag on the right to vote trigger
Bearden’s heightened scrutiny.222 Even Rodriguez—which limited wealthbased Equal Protection claims—stated, “The Court has long afforded
zealous protection against unjustifiable governmental interference with the
individual’s rights to speak and to vote.”223 Some states have tried to legislate
around Bearden. Florida’s new law, for example, defines the payment of
carceral debts as part of a felon’s “term of sentence.”224 In so doing, the law
216
217
218
219
220

221

222
223
224

Harper, 383 U.S. at 667.
Id.
Id. at 668 (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561–562)
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 115–16; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16 (“[The law at issue] could not withstand
the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in reviewing legislative judgments
that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights or that involve suspect classifications.”).
Some scholars have also advanced the view that these laws are subject to a disparate impact
challenge, since over-policing produces disproportionate conviction and felony rates among
minority communities. See, Karlan, supra note 215, at 1164 (“The felon disenfranchisement cases
offer an attractive vehicle for courts to express their concern with the staggering burdens the war
on drugs and significantly disparate incarceration rates have imposed on the minority community.”)
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 105 (“The basic right to participate in political processes as voters and
candidates cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license.”).
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 213. This is a common tactic for states to try to bypass
Bearden. See also Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We have little trouble
concluding that Arizona has a rational basis for restoring voting rights only to those felons who
have completed the terms of their sentences, which includes the payment of any fines or restitution
orders.”); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 771 (Wash. 2007) (upholding a similar law).
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purports not to impose a voter restriction based on ability to pay, but rather
to condition voting on the completion of a sentence that itself includes a
payment requirement. This is a legal shell game. In Bearden, the Court struck
down efforts to “automatically convert” a fine into a prison sentence for those
unable to pay.225 Here, felon disenfranchisement laws convert a fine into a
permanent denial of the right to vote by calling the fine a part of the sentence.
These laws should not escape Bearden’s four-factor scrutiny.
Even so, not a single appellate court addressing felon voter
disenfranchisement laws has applied Bearden. In an unpublished opinion, the
Fourth Circuit upheld a $10 fee required to begin the process of restoring
felon voting rights.226 Rejecting the plaintiff’s claim under Harper, the court
stated, “it is not his right to vote upon which payment of a fee is being
conditioned; rather, it is the restoration of his civil rights upon which the
payment of a fee is being conditioned.”227 In other words, there is no
problem with denying the right to vote based on inability to pay, so long as
all other civil rights are denied in kind. This view finds no support in Bearden
and M.L.B., where the heightened scrutiny can be applied to the denial of
any right, including the right to “participate in political processes as voters
and candidates.”228
Other circuits have flatly denied that the right to vote is fundamental for
felons.229 These circuits deal with Harper in short shrift, probably because the
Court found just the opposite: the right to vote is fundamental and cannot be
conditioned on payment.230 These cases also find little support in Richardson.
In that case, the only question was whether California could deny a felon’s
right to vote, across the board.231 Richardson, however, is not controlling when a
state takes away the right to vote, but later provides a selective avenue for
restoration, based on ability to pay. Rather, Griffin and Bearden are better
225

226
227
228
229

230
231

Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667 (“The rule of Williams and Tate, then, is that the State cannot impose a fine
as a sentence and then automatically convert it into a jail term solely because the defendant is
indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.”) (citations omitted).
Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at *2. The court also misinterpreted Harper as a case relying solely on the Twenty-fourth
Amendment, rather than an intersectional claim relying on Equal Protection as well.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124.
See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Having lost their voting rights,
Plaintiffs lack any fundamental interest to assert.”); Madison, 163 P.3d at 770 (“Convicted felons . . .
no longer possess that fundamental right as a direct result of their decision to commit a felony.”);
Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079 (“[T]he denial of the statutory benefit of re-enfranchisement . . . is not a
fundamental right.”).
Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.
See Cammett, supra note 9, at 391 (“Because Richardson v. Ramirez allows courts to render felons’
voting rights less than fundamental, courts have engaged in the use of this legal formality.”).
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analogs.232 In Griffin, the Court noted that states were not required to offer
an appeal in the first place, but if they did offer an appeal, they must do so in
a way that did not selectively discriminate against the poor.233 So it may be
true that, under Richardson, states can deny felons the right to vote.234 But
when states offer re-enfranchisement in a way that closes the voting booth
only to those who cannot pay, the discrimination is no different than in
Griffin. Finally, even if these courts are correct that a felon’s right to vote is
not fundamentals, Bearden still may apply. And indeed, M.L.B. stated that
when the voting right is conditioned on the ability to pay, the law must be
subjected to Bearden’s four-factor scrutiny.235
If the courts subjected these laws to Bearden’s heightened scrutiny,236 they
would find the laws cannot stand. The Washington Supreme Court recently
summarized, then (wrongly) refused to apply Bearden’s heightened scrutiny
against pay-to-vote laws.237 Under Bearden, (1) voting is a significant right—
indeed, fundamental; (2) there is little means-end rationality because “wealth
. . . is not germane to one’s ability participate intelligently in the electoral
process”238; (3) even though the state is entitled to recoup carceral debts, “the
basic right to participate in political processes as voters and candidates
cannot be limited to those who can pay for a license”239; and (4) there are
alternatives to a pay-to-vote law (states could offer a community service
repayment option, rather than denying the right to vote). Felon
disenfranchisement laws that require carceral debt repayment, when
stripped bare, are nothing more than modern day poll taxes for ex-felons.
Under Bearden, these laws cannot stand because they unjustifiably burden the
right to vote solely on the inability to pay.
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234
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237
238
239

Plaintiffs in Griffin, Williams, and Bearden were all criminally convicted persons.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (“It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all. . . . But that is not to say that a State that does
grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defendants on
account of their poverty.”).
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124.
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 666–67 (“[This issue] requires a careful inquiry into such factors as ‘[1] the
nature of the individual interest affected, [2] the extent to which it is affected, [3] the rationality of
the connection between legislative means and purpose, and [4] the existence of alternative means
for effectuating the purpose.’”).
Madison, 163 P.3d at 771 (summarizing and summarily rejecting the dissent’s theory of the case).
Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 105.
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CONCLUSION
While preventing injustice to the poor may pose “an age-old problem,”
it remains alive and well today.240 Injustice reared its head in Ferguson when
a woman cited for a parking violation ended up owing over $1000 in fines
and was incarcerated twice for her inability to pay. Likewise, when indigent
persons are locked up for being unable to repay their public defenders, there
is an injustice. When the poor are detained in pretrial detention because
they cannot pay fixed-sum bail, there is an injustice. And when an ex-felon’s
right to vote is conditioned on ability to pay, there is an injustice. The Court
has provided a framework for identifying these injustices in Bearden’s
heightened, four-factor scrutiny. This scrutiny should apply to laws denying
rights to the poor “solely by reason of their indigency.”241 Further, M.L.B.
stated that Bearden applies, at the very least, for criminal and quasi criminal
cases and when the right to vote or parental rights are at stake.242 But this
should not limit Bearden’s scrutiny to that context. Instead, “[p]eople [should]
never ceas[e] to hope and strive to move closer to that goal” of equal justice
for rich and poor alike.243
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Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667.
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16.

